1University of Central Florida · 2North South University · 3Ahsanullah University of Science and Technology · 4Purdue University Fort Wayne
A multi-agent LLM pipeline chains a planner, workers, a verifier, and a synthesizer, and every hop between them is an unmonitored channel. We show that an undefended pipeline reporting perfect safety is often borrowing that safety from the cloud provider's filter — then replace it with deterministic, application-owned gates on all six channels.
Code release pending — the review copy ships an anonymized artifact
Existing defenses guard only the input boundary — IBProtector, Llama Guard, perplexity filters, SmoothLLM — or run outside the application as opaque, stochastic provider-side content filters. Everything downstream of the first hop is unguarded. That gap carries a consequence practitioners rarely measure: a pipeline can report attack success of 0.000 on tool- and memory-poisoning and look fully safe, while almost none of that safety is actually its own.
Planner to worker, tool to worker, worker to memory, worker to verifier, workers to synthesizer. An adversary who reaches any one of them can smuggle instructions into an agent that never sees the user's input boundary.
Pooled over tool- and memory-poisoning on Azure GPT-5, the undefended pipeline owes 54 of 60 of its blocks (90%) to the provider's server-side filter. Its own architecture contributes nothing at the tool boundary, because it has no gate there.
Move the same pipeline to a backend with no provider filter and the identical 0.000 outcome is instead produced entirely by the agent model's own alignment. The number never moves; the mechanism changes completely. Outcome-only reporting cannot see this.
ChannelGuard is a training-free, defense-in-depth framework that places an information-bottleneck gate on every inter-agent channel. Each gate splits channel text into sentences, embeds them, scores maximum cosine similarity against an adversarial phrase bank, and deterministically passes, compresses, or blocks. No LLM call is added. Alongside it, a per-trace attribution method records which layer first stopped each attack, so safety can be sourced rather than merely counted.

Figure 1. The ChannelGuard system. Top: the threat surface, with attack families entering at different channels. Middle: the multi-agent pipeline instrumented with six information-bottleneck gates. Bottom left: the decision process at each gate — sentence embedding, maximum cosine similarity against the phrase bank, then a threshold decision routing to pass, compress, or block. Bottom right: per-sample execution traces feed the attribution analysis that identifies the first defensive layer to stop each attack.
Channel text is split into sentences and embedded; the gate takes the maximum cosine similarity against a 20-phrase adversarial bank. MiniLM scoring runs in roughly 5 ms on CPU, three orders of magnitude below any LLM call.
A threshold decision maps risk to one of three deterministic actions: low risk passes forward unchanged, medium risk is compressed to retain only the benign prefix, high risk is blocked and the content discarded.
Every trace records the first layer to stop the attack: an IB gate, the provider filter, the verifier, the synthesizer's hard refusal, or nothing at all. This is what makes borrowed safety visible.
Because a gate scores the poisoned string directly, it never depends on the agent that will read it, or on a vendor's filter. That is why its block rate is identical across all three backends.
| Gate | Channel | Guarded by prior defenses |
|---|---|---|
| IB0 | User → Planner | yes |
| IB1 | Planner → each Worker | — |
| IB2 | Worker → Memory / Verifier | — |
| IB3 | Tool → Worker | — |
| IB3-mem | Memory → Worker (on read) | — |
| IB4 | Worker → Verifier | — |
| IB5 | All Workers → Synthesizer | — |
Table 1. Gate placements. Only IB0 coincides with the input boundary that prior defenses guard; the other five cover the inter-agent surface. IB3 is highlighted because it is the gate that takes over tool-output poisoning from the provider filter.
Across 2,100 traces, eight attack families, five defenses, and three model backends. Aggregate attack success is tied at 0.000 on five of eight families, which is exactly why outcome-only reporting is insufficient — the interesting question is how each system reaches zero.
| Attack | Undefended | ChannelGuard |
|---|---|---|
| Prompt Injection | 0.333 | 0.167 |
| Tool Poisoning | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Memory Poisoning | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Slow-Drift Memory | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Consent-Escalation Memory | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Role-Confusion Memory | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Adaptive Paraphrase (white-box) | 0.667 | 0.667 |
| Benign | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Table 2. Attack success rate, n = 30 per cell, Azure GPT-5, paired on identical sample IDs. ChannelGuard halves prompt-injection success (0.333 → 0.167). Five rows are tied at zero; Table 3 shows the blocking mechanism differs sharply on three of them.
| System | Attack | leak | ib | prov | ver | syn | safe |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Undefended | Prompt Injection | 10 | 0 | 6 | 4 | 0 | 10 |
| ChannelGuard | Prompt Injection | 5 | 21 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| Undefended | Tool Poisoning | 0 | 0 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| ChannelGuard | Tool Poisoning | 0 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Undefended | Memory Poisoning | 0 | 0 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ChannelGuard | Memory Poisoning | 0 | 2 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| Undefended | Consent-Escalation | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 24 |
| ChannelGuard | Consent-Escalation | 0 | 20 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 8 |
Table 3. Per-trace attribution, n = 30 each row. leak = attack succeeded; ib = blocked by an IB gate; prov = Azure provider filter; ver = verifier flagged unsafe; syn = synthesizer hard refusal; safe = answered without leaking, no external help attributed. Bold marks the dominant mechanism. On tool poisoning the undefended pipeline's zero rests on the provider for 24/30; ChannelGuard blocks 30/30 at its own IB3 gate.
| Backend | System | IB | prov | model-handled | ASR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Azure GPT-5 | Undefended | 0 | 24 | 6 | 0.000 |
| Azure GPT-5 | ChannelGuard | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0.000 |
| Anthropic Sonnet 4.5 | Undefended | 0 | 0 | 30 | 0.000 |
| Anthropic Sonnet 4.5 | ChannelGuard | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0.000 |
| Anthropic Haiku 4.5 | Undefended | 0 | 0 | 30 | 0.000 |
| Anthropic Haiku 4.5 | ChannelGuard | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0.000 |
Table 4. Tool poisoning only, n = 30 per row. This is the cleanest view of mechanism substitution: the undefended pipeline is 100% provider-filter on Azure and 100% model-handled on both Anthropic backends, a complete re-sourcing of the same zero. ChannelGuard's IB3 block is 30/30 on all three, unchanged. Both Anthropic entries are the same vendor at two sizes, so the contrast that matters is Azure (with a strong external filter) versus Anthropic (with none).
GSM8K accuracy is 0.867 with and without the gates — identical, not merely close. Benign-preservation rate is 0.533 against the undefended pipeline's 0.567, at a lower false-positive rate (0.033 vs 0.067).
Gates add no LLM call, and early blocking short-circuits work: 3.30× wall-clock speedup on prompt injection and 1.19× pooled across all 210 attack traces. Planner latency is unchanged to within 10 ms.
A cross-family judge audit reaches κ = 0.900, and a sentinel-randomization test checks the block counts are not an artifact of the success criterion. Total measured cost of the full evaluation: $47.36.
Two results run against the phrase-bank approach, and the paper states both directly rather than burying them. Reporting a defense's failure modes is the point of the attribution machinery, not an exception to it.
An adaptive attacker who rewrites an injection to be semantically equivalent but lexically distant from the bank defeats all embedding-based gates, ChannelGuard's included, at 0.667 attack success. SmoothLLM's perturb-and-vote strategy does substantially better here, at 0.200.
Gates and provider filters catch overlapping but non-identical subsets, and on memory poisoning the provider filter still does most of the work even with ChannelGuard active. Treat them as defense-in-depth. A Claude classifier at IB0 also beats the phrase bank as a single input gate, 30/30 against 21/30.
If you find ChannelGuard or the per-trace attribution methodology useful in your research, please consider citing the paper.